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DEAR JUSTICE WHITE
Carl Tobias*

I. INTRODUCTION

Congratulations on your selection as Chair of the Commission on
Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals that the United
States Congress recently authorized. 1 The Commission has a valuable
opportunity to evaluate the intermediate appellate courts and make
constructive recommendations for improvement at an important time for the
circuits. These courts' burgeoning dockets and insufficient resources now
threaten appellate justice.
When the House-Senate Appropriations Conference Committee crafted
the compromise which created the Commission, its members made two
astute decisions.
First, Congress recognized that the circuits are
experiencing a "crisis of volume" which warrants serious scrutiny by an
expert, independent entity. Second, senators and representatives rejected an
ill-advised proposal to split the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit. 2 This suggestion would have afforded neither the existing Ninth
Circuit nor the appellate system any overall advantage because the identical
complement of judges would have been treating the same total number of
cases. Indeed, the recommendation's unbalanced distribution of judgeships
and appeals would have exacerbated the current Ninth Circuit's situation.
Most salient, the measure would have required that members of the new
Twelfth Circuit resolve fifty-percent fewer cases annually than judges of the
projected Ninth Circuit, thus complicating the proposed Ninth Circuit's
efforts to conclude appeals promptly, efficaciously and equitably. Finally,

*
Professor of Law, William S. Boyd School of Law, University of Nevada, Las Vegas. I
wish to thank Tom Baker, Rick Bales and Peggy Sanner for valuable suggestions, Cecilia Palmer
and Charlotte Wilmerton for processing this piece, and the Harris Trust for generous, continuing
support. Errors that remain are mine.
1.
See Members Named to Commission, THE THIRD BRANCH, Feb. 1998, at l; see also
Department of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations
Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-119, § 305, Ill Stat. 2440, 2491-92 (1997) (reprinted at 28
U.S.C.A. § 41 (1997) (historical and statutory notes)). I submitted these ideas to the Commission
in May, 1998.
2.
See S. 1022, 105th Cong. § 305 (1997).
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the suggestion would simply have ignored the circumstances of the
remaining appellate courts.
Unfortunately, the legislation whkh established the Commission was also
flawed in two major respects. First, Congress assigned the Commission an
ambiguous mandate. The charge to "study the present division of the United
States into the several judicial circuits [and] ... the structure and alignment
of the Federal Court of Appeals system, with particular reference to the
Ninth Circuit, " 3 left unclear exactly how much emphasis this court should
receive. Every circuit has encountered expanding dockets; however, the
courts differ significantly in terms of caseload size, complexity and growth
rates as well as resources for addressing appeals. All of the appellate courts
have applied creative, diverse measures that are intended to expedite cases
but maintain effective and fair resolution, while they have realized varying
degrees of success. The Ninth Circuit has ambitiously experimented with the
broadest spectrum of devices, numerous of which have offered substantial
benefits. These factors mean that the court might well be deciding appeals
as promptly, efficaciously and equitably as a number of other circuits and
deserves Commission consideration more as a solution than a problem.
Another difficulty with the statutory mandate was its explicit focus on
boundary and structural modifications.
The command instructed the
Commission to report "recommendations for such changes in circuit
boundaries or structure as may be appropriate for the expeditious and
effective disposition of the caseload of the Federal Courts of Appeal,
4
consistent with fundamental concepts of fairness and due process. "
Boundary adjustments essentially reallocate the workload and may disrupt
precedent and judicial administration. Therefore, the Commission should
carefully assess a wide range of structural techniques, such as Ninth Circuit
reliance on bankruptcy appellate panels, many of which have been salutary,
although the entity must also analyze the mechanisms' potential drawbacks.
Moreover, the most efficacious measures, including technological
innovations and increased dependence on court staff, do not alter circuit
boundaries or structure. Thus, the Commission should flexibly interpret its
charge to encompass these remedies and should comprehensively survey
them.
A second flaw in the compromise which approved the Commission was
the limited time accorded the entity to complete its apparently daunting task.
Congress provided the Commission ten months for studying the appeals

3.
4.

§ 305, 111 Stat. at 2491.
Id.
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courts and two months for developing proposals. I, therefore, evaluate the
difficulties that the circuits confront and canvass possible solutions to suggest
how the Commission might finish the work most efficiently in the brief
compass allotted. I propose that the entity restrictively conceptualize its
assignment and effectively employ the short period by narrowly, but fairly,
reading the legislative mandate and by applying this command to data, which
are presently available or which could easily be secured, on how the
appellate courts are resolving cases.

II. ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE CRISIS OF VOLUME

There is considerable agreement that substantial growth in the appeals
which attorneys and parties pursued over the last quarter century and varying
resources, especially judges, that the circuits had for addressing cases led
them to invoke a number of responses which conflict or have disparate
6
"From July 1, 1972 to June 30, 1992, filings in the courts of
effects.
appeals rose from 13 ,694 to 43 ,481, an increase of 218 %. " 7 Lawyers and
litigants concomitantly sought appellate review of trial judges' decisions at a
much higher rate perhaps because few disincentives inhibited them. For
instance, parties appealed one of forty district court determinations in 1945,
8
but one of eight in 1989. Congress also expanded the civil and criminal
jurisdiction of federal courts, but authorized too few additional judgeships to
keep pace with mounting circuit dockets. The above phenomena led the
Federal Courts Study Committee to declare during 1990 that the "appellate
courts are in a 'crisis of volume' that has transformed them from the
institutions they were even a generation ago. "9
These circumstances prompted the regional circuits to apply numerous,
inconsistent measures. Today courts differ significantly in the following
ways: the alternatives to dispute resolution (ADR) which the circuits employ;
the percentage of three-judge panels that include active members of specific
5.
See id. at 2492; see also H.R. 908, 105th Cong. (1997) (showing that the House of
Representatives unanimously accorded the Commission eighteen months to work).
6.
I rely in this paragraph on William M. Richman & William L. Reynolds, Elitism,
Expediency, ar:zd the New Certiorari: Requiem for the Learned Hand Tradition, 81 CORNELL L.
REY. 273, 277-78, 297-339 (1996); Carl Tobias, The New Certiorari and a National Study of the

Appeals Courts, 81 CORNELL L. REY. 1264, 1266-75 (1996). See generally THOMAS E. BAKER,
RATIONING JUSTICE ON APPEAL THE PROBLEMS OF THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS (1994)

(affording comprehensive analysis of the appeals courts).
7.
JUDITH MCKENNA, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER,
STRUCTURAL
ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS 18 (1993).
8.
See REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITIEE 110 (1990).

9.

Id. at 109.

AND

OTHER
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courts; the opportunities which the circuits afford for oral arguments; the en
bane procedures that courts use; how decisionmakers resolve appeals by
reviewing briefs, consulting and finalizing determinations; collegiality among
judges; the time needed to conclude cases; the consistency of judicial
decisionmaking; the forms which the circuits' determinations assume; the
restrictions on citation to unpublished dispositions that the courts impose; the
availability of circuit decisions; and the responsibilities which the courts
. to circmt
. . staff . 10
assign
Burgeoning appellate dockets, disparities in the resources that appeals
courts possess, and circuits' diverse responses to caseload growth apparently
comprise inextricably intertwined, and even intractable, problems which defy
felicitous resolution. However, application of the statutory mandate to
existing information, and to material that could rather easily be collected,
analyzed and synthesized, related to appellate courts' treatment of appeals
should enable the Commission to complete its task in a timely fashion.

III. ANALYZING PROBLEMS THAT THE APPEALS COURTS MAY BE
EXPERIENCING

A. Parsing the Statutory Mandate

The Commission's authorizing statute instructed it to "study the present
division of the United States into the several judicial circuits [and] . . . the
structure and alignment of the Federal Court of Appeals system, with
particular reference to the Ninth Circuit" and to report "recommendations
for such changes in circuit boundaries or structure as may be appropriate for
the expeditious and effective disposition of the caseload of the Federal
Courts of Appeal, consistent with fundamental concepts of fairness and due
process. " 11 This charge can properly be interpreted as requiring the
Commission to suggest modifications in boundaries or structure only after it
10. See, e.g., 4TH CIR. R. 34-36; 9TH CIR. R. 34-36. lOTH CIR. R. 34-36; see also infra
notes 18-30 and accompanying text. See generally Gregory C. Sisk, The Balkanization of Appellate
Justice: The Proliferation of Local Rules in the Federal Circuits, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. I (1997)
(discussing the divergent practices of the circuit courts and suggesting methods to improve
uniformity). The responses and their effects differ, but judges write fully-reasoned opinions, after
hearing oral arguments and closely conferring with their colleagues, in a dwindling percentage of
cases. See Richman & Reynolds, supra note 6, at 274-78; see also BAKER, supra note 6, at 14-30.
11. Department of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies
Appropriations Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-119, § 305, Ill Stat. 2440, 2491 (1997) (reprinted at
28 U.S.C.A. § 41 (1997) (historical and statutory notes)).
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conclusively determines that alterations are necessary for, and will promote,
the prompt, efficacious and fair resolution of cases. In other words, the
Commission must first definitively find that specific regional circuits do not
decide appeals expeditiously, effectively and equitably before considering
whether boundary or structural adjustments would rectify these three
phenomena. Even then, the Commission should propose only those changes
which would clearly foster prompt, efficacious and fair treatment both of
particular courts' dockets and of the appellate system's caseload without
imposing substantial disadvantages.
The statutory mandate apparently contemplated that the Commission
would attempt to define and measure expeditious, effective and equitable
resolution in terms of similarly calibrated applicable parameters while
identifying and allowing for relevant variables. For example, when the
Commission evaluates speed, it should consult the idea of time to disposition
calculated from the same starting point, namely filing of the notice of appeal
or of briefs. When the Commission assesses efficacy and fairness, it might
consider such factors as how frequently the circuits provide oral arguments
and published opinions and, when they do so, how carefully judges respond
12
to the contentions proffered or explain the results.
The Commission must correspondingly delineate and provide for
pertinent variables, including dockets' relative complexity, which
complicated appeals from administrative agency decisionmaking to the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit aptly
epitomize, and the judicial resources that are available for addressing cases,
which vacancies in one fifth of the Ninth Circuit's authorized judgeships
illustrate. These factors could skew evaluation, for instance, by masking the
consumption of additional time or the inefficiencies that judicial openings can
create; they are variables that the Commission might not otherwise take into
account.
Time to disposition as well as the percentages of appeals that receive oral
arguments and published opinions are closely related, and they are
informative measures of prompt, effective and equitable resolution. The
Commission may want to examine additional parameters, but some will resist
calibration, and their meaning will be even more. difficult to assess. One
helpful example is the accuracy of substantive decisionmaking, that is,
12.
Oral argument may improve judges' understanding, while opportunities to argue before,
and receive published opinions from, circuits that can be the courts of last resort may increase
visibility, accountability and public confidence. See, e.g., Daniel J. Meador, Toward Orality and

Visibility in the Appellate Process, 42 MD. L. REV. 732 (1983); ABA ACTION COMMIITEE TO
REDUCE COSTS AND DELAY, ATTACKING LITIGATION COSTS AND DELAY 26-27 (1984); see also
BAKER, supra note 6, at 165-66; PAUL D. CARRINGTON ET AL .. JUSTICE ON APPEAL 1-12 (1976).
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whether the courts reach appropriate results. The Commission might attempt
to analyze the records, briefs, oral arguments and determinations in
particular cases when ascertaining whether judges properly resolve appeals.
Nevertheless, several phenomena will frustrate this effort. For instance, it is
virtually impossible to evaluate oral arguments, especially how they
influence decisionmaking, or to find conclusively that a judgment is correct
even once the Supreme Court has ruled.
The Commission could concomitantly consult the rate at which the High
Court reverses opinions of specific appellate courts. Indeed, senators who
favor splitting the Ninth Circuit argue that the number and percentage of its
determinations that the Supreme Court overturns is a compelling reason for
bifurcation. 13 However, the many variables, some of which are difficult to
identify, isolate and allow for-such as why attorneys and parties decide to
appeal, specific Justices' interests and the plethora of Ninth Circuit cases that
the Court has recently chosen to review-which attend the reversal rate
14
complicate attempts to derive reliable conclusions from that statistic.
The statutory mandate's phraseology, which speaks in terms of prompt,
effective and fair appellate disposition, also encourages comparisons among
the circuits. Congress apparently envisioned that the Commission would
first definitively decide that particular courts are not expeditiously,
efficaciously and equitably addressing appeals-a determination which the
entity can most confidently make after comparing and finding deficient the
individual circuit's performance vis-a-vis the remaining courts. Only once
the Commission conclusively ascertains that specific circuits are failing to
treat cases promptly, effectively and fairly and that boundary or structural
alterations would clearly promote expeditious, efficacious and equitable
resolution and impose no substantial disadvantages, should the entity
prescribe recommendations for such modifications.

13. See, e.g., 143 CONG. REC. S8041, S8044 (daily ed. July 24, 1997) (statement of Sen.
Conrad Burns); id. at S8047 (statement of Sen. Slade Gorton). But see ABA Board of Governors
Working Group on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts 6 (Apr. 24, 1998) [hereinafter
ABA Resolution].
14. See Procter Hug, Jr., The Ninth Circuit Functions Well And Should Not Be Divided, FED.
LA w., Aug. 1998, at 40; Carl Tobias, Suggestions For Studying The Federal Appellate System, 49
FLA. L. REV. 189, 225 (1997); see also infra sentence between text accompanying notes 21 and 22
(suggesting difficulty of assessing meaning even of parameters that can be calibrated).
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B. Applying the Statutory Mandate: Expeditious, Effective and Fair
Appellate Resolution
Several parameters might usefully serve as accurate measures of whether
particular appellate courts promptly, effectively and fairly decide their
appeals. One obvious yardstick for speed is time to disposition, although the
Commission must insure that temporal factors are identically calculated
while providing for applicable variables, such as case complexity. Recent
statistics indicate that the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits ne.ed greater time to
15
address appeals in certain absolute senses. The Commission might attempt
to ascertain whether the courts actually afford less expeditious treatment and,
if so, why. For example, the Ninth Circuit concludes cases faster, in terms
of several measurements, than numerous courts, permits oral arguments
more frequently than some circuits, and furnishes written, reasoned
16
dispositions at a higher rate than most appellate courts.
Instructive parameters for determining whether regional circuits
efficaciously and fairly decide appeals are the percentage of counseled cases
terminated on the merits in which courts hear oral arguments and the
percentage of counseled appeals resolved on the merits in which circuits
issue published opinions.
The Commission might consult applicable
empirical data by, for instance, considering those courts that compiled
percentages which were below the national average in the 1997 fiscal year.
The Third, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth and Eleventh Circuits failed to attain that
average for either oral arguments or published opinions; however, the Ninth
and Fifth Circuits more closely approached it for oral arguments and
17
published opinions respectively.
The Commission should also attempt to
adjust for relevant variables and to discern whether the five courts in fact
provide less effective and equitable resolution by, for example, evaluating

15.
See Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts. Median Time Intervals in Cases
Terminated After Hearing or Submission, by Circuit during the Twelve Month Period Ended Dec.
31, 1997, Table B4 (I 998) (on file with author) [hereinafter Terminated Cases]. For example, the
Eleventh Circuit is slowest from tiling notice of appeal to filing last brief, while that court is third.
and the Ninth Circuit is second, slowest from filing notice of appeal to final disposition. See id.
16. The court is quickest from submission to final disposition and third quickest from hearing
to final disposition. See id.; see also NINTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS REORGANIZATION ACT
OF 1995, S. REP. No. 197, at 22 (1995) (affording data on oral arguments and written dispositions)
[hereinafter SENATE REPORT]; William W Schwarzer, Statement to the Commission on Structural
Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals 1-2 (Apr. 24, 1998) (visited Nov. 12, 1998)
<http: //app .comm. uscourts.gov /hearings/newyork/0424SCHW. htm >
[hereinafter
Schwarzer
Statement] (analyzing variables).
17.
See Federal Judicial Center, Snapshot of Appeals Terminated in FY 1997 (1998) (on file
with author) [hereinafter Snapshot]. The Ninth Circuit held oral arguments in two, and the Fifth
Circuit issued published opinions in three, percent fewer cases than the national average. See id.
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the time which they actually devote to conducting oral arguments and to
producing published opinions. This material and the data on disposition
times suggest that the Third, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth and Eleventh Circuits may
not decide appeals promptly, efficaciously and fairly today.

C. Narrowing the Commission Inquiry
Even if the above information fails to demonstrate with the reqms1te
certainty that some appellate courts expeditiously, effectively and equitably
resolve cases, the statistics afford a sufficiently reliable basis for narrowing
the scope of the Commission's inquiry. For instance, the material on
disposition times as well as percentages of oral arguments and published
opinions could support Commission findings that the First, Second, Sixth,
Seventh, Eighth, Tenth and D.C. Circuits were, and that the five remaining
appellate courts might have been, addressing their appeals promptly,
efficaciously and fairly at least during fiscal year 1997. However, the
Commission may want to consider similar data regarding earlier periods, to
project into the future or to consult additional measures.
Insofar as the information on time to disposition as well as the
percentages of oral arguments and published opinions accurately shows that
regional circuits accord cases expeditious, effective and equitable treatment,
the material could permit the Commission to limit its work substantially.
The Commission might first briefly re-evaluate whether any of the five
appeals courts designated does decide cases promptly, efficaciously and
fairly, and thus, can be eliminated from consideration, or whether certain
circuits perform so much better that they could receive relatively little
attention. For example, the statistics on time to disposition indicate that the
Third, Fourth and Fifth Circuits are addressing appeals expeditiously, even
as the data on oral arguments and published opinions may demonstrate that
the courts do not provide effective and equitable resolution. The information
on oral arguments and on published opinions suggests that the Ninth and
Fifth Circuits respectively decide cases with comparative efficacy and
fairness, but the material on time to disposition apparently shows that the
courts afford rather slow disposition. Therefore, the Commission might, and
probably should, conclude that the circumstances of the Third, Fourth, Fifth,
Ninth and Eleventh Circuits remain sufficiently unclear that they warrant
greater analysis, partly because the available information is neither broad nor
18
Even if the Commission
refined enough to support conclusive judgments.
18. The Senate Judiciary Committee majority afforded data showing that the Fifth and
Eleventh Circuits were more efficient than the Ninth, even as the minority offered equally valid data
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decides to assess further those five courts, the determination that seven
regional circuits promptly, effectively and equitably address appeals and,
accordingly, require minimal additional examination would significantly
19
circumscribe the Commission's efforts.

D. Scrutinizing the Five Courts
When the Commission attempts to ascertain more definitively whether
these five appellate courts expeditiously, efficaciously and fairly resolve
cases, it should closely evaluate their actual practices while considering
parameters other than time to disposition, percentages of oral arguments, and
published opinions.
For instance, the Commission could analyze the
consequences of the Third Circuit's reliance on judgment orders and the
choice of the Third, Fifth and Eleventh Circuits not to make their
unpublished opm1ons available on line.
The Commission might
concomitantly explore how the Eleventh Circuit annually terminates 275
appeals on the merits per authorized judgeship when the national average is
20
155 and assess this disposition rate's impacts on specific cases.
Another
important statistic shows that more than one-sixth of all three-judge panels
constituted by the court and by the Ninth Circuit include a decisionmaker
21
who is not an active member of the particular appellate court.
The
Commission could ask whether reliance on visiting judges promotes intercircuit consistency and helpful interchange or whether it increases the
potential for intracircuit conflicts while imposing expense. Some evidence
correspondingly suggests that a majority of the Fourth Circuit's judges may
employ the en bane procedure to reverse panel determinations with which
22
they disagree politically. The Commission might want to evaluate these
showing the opposite. Compare SENATE REPORT, supra note 16, at 9-10, with Snapshot, supra note
17.
19. This is not the only way to narrow the inquiry. while more time to study or more data
may prove my ideas incorrect. The approach is defensible, given available data and the short time
for the Commission to complete a potentially enormous task. Indeed, some observers essentially
argue that no circuits properly resolve appeals and argue for systemic solutions. See, e.g., Judith
Resnik, Statement Submitted to Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of
Appeals (Apr. 24, 1998) (visited Nov. 12, 1998) < http://app.comm.uscourts.gov/hearings/newyork
/0427RES.htm >; Richman & Reynolds, supra note 6.
20. See Snapshot, supra note 17. This annual rate could be considered a parameter.
21. See Participation by Visiting Judges in Certain Work of the Federal Courts of Appeals,
1993 Through 1997, Table I (preliminary data); see also id. (showing 153 national average);
Resnik, supra note 19, at 4 (analyzing visitors' benefits). These data could be considered
parameters.
22. See, e.g., Riley v. Dorton, 115 F.3d 1159 (4th Cir. 1997); Miller v. Smith, 115 F.3d
1136 (4th Cir. 1997); see also Hopwood v. Texas, 84 F.3d 720, 721 (5th Cir. 1996) (Politz, C.J.,
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practices by collecting, analyzing and synthesizing relevant empirical
evidence, perhaps with surveys and interviews of affected judges, lawyers
and parties.
There are actual appellate court practices which the Commission could
consider in addition to the forms that resolution assumes; the accessibility of
dispositions; how decisionmakers review briefs, choose whether to hear oral
arguments, confer and reach determinations; reliance on visiting judges; and
circuits' employment of the en bane mechanism.
These include the
alternatives to dispute resolution (ADR) that courts use, the collegiality of
judges, the duties which circuits assign court staff, and the strictures imposed
on citation of certain dispositions. For example, examination of the local
circuit rules that apply to ADR, staff deployment, and decisions which
lawyers may cite, reveals considerable disparity among the appeals courts
and indicates that some circuits might treat cases less expeditiously,
efficaciously and fairly than others.
However, the Commission must
definitively ascertain whether this impression, derived from assessing the
requirements as written, is accurate by scrutinizing the courts' practices.
Parameters which the Commission could consult, apart from time to
disposition as well as percentages of oral arguments and published opinions,
encompass the consistency of intracircuit judicial decisionmaking and the
reversal rate.
For instance, the only systematic study of precedent's
operation in a large appellate court, the Ninth Circuit, found that the court
23
has "generally succeeded in avoiding conflicts between panel decisions. "
Chief Judge Procter Hug, Jr., of the Ninth Circuit recently contended that
"reversal rate of the cases selected for review by the Supreme Court is not a
legitimate basis for evaluating the performance of [this appeals court] and is
24
certainly no basis for dividing a circuit. " Chief Judge Hug argued that the
court must "resolve more complicated, novel and important issues than other
circuits," that several appeals courts had higher reversal rates than the Ninth
Circuit, and that the Supreme Court overturned fewer than one percent of
the Ninth Circuit's merits terminations during 1996. 25

dissenting from failure to grant rehearing en bane). See generally Douglas H. Ginsburg & Donald
Falk, The Court En Banc: 1981-90, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1008 (1991); Michael E. Solimine,
Ideology and En Banc Review, 67 N.C. L. REV. 29 (1998).
23. MCKENNA, supra note 7, at 94; see also Arthur D. Hellman, Maintaining Consistency in
the Law of the Large Circuit, in RESTRUCTURING JUSTICE 55-90 (Arthur D. Hellman ed., 1990);
Arthur D. Hellman, Breaking the Banc: The Common-Law Process in the Large Appellate Court, 23
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 915 (1991); Arthur D. Hellman, Jumboism and Jurisprudence: The Theory and
Practice of Precedent in the large Appellate Court, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 541 ( 1989).
24. Hug, supra note 14, at 40.
25. See id.; see also supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
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When the Commission evaluates the five appellate courts which might not
be promptly, effectively and equitably addressing appeals, it should
remember that there may be multiple acceptable ways to decide cases. For
example, the Third, Fourth and Eleventh Circuits issue published opinions
less frequently than the remaining courts and permit oral arguments in a
significantly smaller percentage of appeals than all except one. 26
Nevertheless, Commission analysis of actual practices might reveal that those
three circuits are providing cases the treatment which they deserve and,
therefore, are expeditiously, efficaciously and fairly ·resolving appeals.
More specifically, pro se litigants pursue most of the cases in which the three
27
courts do not afford published opinions and oral arguments, thus ~erhaps
2
indicating that appeals receive the attention which they warrant.
The
Second Circuit offers another informative illustration.
The court's
production of published opinions in thirty-nine percent of counseled cases
could suggest that it fails to conclude appeals promptly, effectively and
29
equitably.
However, this figure is higher than the percentages which seven
appellate courts compiled, and even were it lower, the Second Circuit's
provision of oral arguments in eighty-five percent of counseled cases
apparently compensates by according parties opportunities to persuade, and
. responses f rom, d""
receive
ec1s10nma k ers. JO

IV. ANALYZING POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS THAT THE APPEALS
COURTS MAY BE EXPERIENCING

A. An Introductory Comment About Solutions
If the Commission conclusively determines that any appeals courts are not
expeditiously, efficaciously and fairly addressing cases, the entity must then
ascertain whether changes in circuit boundaries or structure would foster
prompt, effective and equitable treatment of appeals by the courts and the
appellate system. It should remember that these modifications might fail to
26.
See Snapshot, supra note 17 and accompanying text. The Third, Fourth, Tenth and
Eleventh Circuits hold oral arguments in thirty percent of cases. See id.
27.
See Snapshot, supra note 17.
28. See Tobias. supra note 6, at 1269-75. But see Resnik, supra note 19; Richman &
Reynolds, supra note 6, at 280-81, 286, 290, 295.
29.
See Snapshot, supra note 17.
30. See id.; Jon 0. Newman, Statement to the Commission on Structural Alternatives for the
Federal Courts of Appeals 2 (Apr. 24, 1998) (visited Nov. 12, 1998) <http://app.comm.uscourts.
gov/hearings/newyork/0424NEWM.htm > [hereinafter Newman statement].
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promote such resolution and that they could impose certain disadvantages,
including detrimental side effects, which may be difficult to predict. For
instance, the recommended alterations of the Ninth Circuit that Congress
31
recently considered certainly would have delayed, and might well have
permitted less efficacious and fair disposition of the proposed Ninth Circuit's
caseload, even though the adjustments suggested could have led to
expeditious, effective and equitable treatment in the projected Twelfth
Circuit, while disrupting precedent and judicial administration. These
developments might have materialized principally because the changes would
have unevenly distributed the docket and judges without authorizing
additional judicial positions, thus leaving members of the new Ninth Circuit
to decide fifty-percent more appeals each year than their counterparts on the
proposed Twelfth Circuit, and would have required duplicative courthouses
32
and circuit administrative structures.
The Commission, therefore, must
insure that boundary and structural modifications will clearly facilitate
prompt, efficacious and fair disposition of the caseload both for specific
courts and for the appellate system.
The Judicial Conference concomitantly registered strong concerns about
adjustments which involve boundaries and structure in the recommendation
on appeals court size and workload of its 1995 Long Range Plan. 33 The
Conference suggested that "[c]ircuit restructuring should occur only if
compelling empirical evidence demonstrates adjudicative or administrative
dysfunction in a court so that it cannot continue to deliver quality justice and
coherent, consistent circuit law in the face of increasing workload. " 34 The
Conference urged that "division of a particular circuit or realignment of
circuit boundaries should continue to be, as it has been historically, an
infrequent event," admonishing that any reconfiguration proposed "must be
considered in the light of the disruption of precedent and judicial
administration that such changes generally entail. " 35 The Federal Judicial

31. See Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Reorganization of 1997, S. 431, 105th Cong.§§ 2-11
(1997); S. 956, 104th Cong. (1995).
32. See S. 431, 105th Cong. (1997); S. 956, 104th Cong. (1995); Letter from Procter Hug,
Jr., Chief Judge, U.S. Courts for the Ninth Circuit, to Sen. Harry M. Reid (D.-Nev.) (July 18,
1997), reprinted in 143 CONG. REC. S8060 (daily ed. July 24, 1997); see also infra notes 69-73, 80
and accompanying text.
33. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL
COURTS 44-45 (1995) [hereinafter LONG RANGE PLAN]. The Conference is the federal courts'
policy-making arm.
34. Id. at 44; see also ABA Resolution, supra note 13, at 4 (endorsing as ABA policy).
35. LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 33, at 45; see also Letter from Edward R. Becker to
Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals (Jan. 26, 1998) (on file
with author) [hereinafter Becker Letter].
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Center, which published a thorough study of the appeals courts in 1993,
correspondingly found that the circuits and judges were under stress,
although it was apparently not one which would have been "significantly
relieved by structural changes to the appellate system at [that] time. " 36
In short, boundary and structural alterations are comparatively dramatic
approaches to which Congress has rarely resorted, which might· not facilitate
expeditious, efficacious and equitable resolution and which could entail
unforeseeable disadvantages, while the analysis above indicates that at least
seven regional circuits promptly, effectively and fairly address cases. 37 The
Commission, thus, must first ascertain whether remedies apart from
boundary modifications would enable particular courts and the appellate
system to treat appeals as quickly, efficaciously and equitably, with fewer
detrimental impacts, and should initially consult solutions which would
directly and narrowly respond to those phenomena that apparently prevent
expeditious, effective and fair appellate disposition today.
In other words, the Commission must exhaust limited, circuit-specific
approaches, which promise to foster prompt, efficacious and equitable
treatment, but that have minimal adverse effects.
For example, the
authorization of several additional judges or the adoption of many remedies
for docket growth-solutions which are more modest than creating
judgeships and less extreme than changing boundaries-may facilitate
expeditious, effective and fair resolution with little disadvantage. The
Commission, therefore, should carefully assess numerous circumscribed
measures which apply to individual appeals courts and definitively determine
that they will fail to encourage prompt, efficacious and equitable disposition
or would have deleterious impacts before the entity considers boundary
alterations.
Finally, even if the Commission examines adjustments in boundaries or
structure, it might well conclude that those modifications by themselves will
simply not facilitate expeditious, effective and fair treatment or would
impose substantial disadvantages and, accordingly, recommend no boundary
38
changes. Illustrative are profosals for splitting the Ninth Circuit which
3
Congress recently evaluated.
Bifurcating the court alone would have
afforded no overall or systemic benefit because division would have only
reallocated the workload with the same contingent of active judges deciding
the identical quantity of cases and could have disrupted precedent and
MCKENNA, supra note 7, at 155. The Center is the courts' major research arm.
37. See supra pp. 8-9.
38. If the Commission so concludes, its mandate suggests that Congress would have intended
it to propose no such alteration. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
39. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
36.
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40

judicial administration.
Members of the new Twelfth Circuit would have
annually confronted 239 appeals and the court would have needed redundant
buildings and personnel, while judges on the proposed Ninth Circuit would
have faced 363 cases yearly and, thus, this court would have processed
appeals more slowly, and perhaps less efficaciously and equitably, than
41
either the projected Twelfth Circuit or the present Ninth Circuit.
Indeed,
Congress's traditional response to caseload growth of realigning appeals
courts and authorizing additional judgeships has marginally facilitated
appellate disposition and seemingly has had some adverse impacts, such as
the erosion of circuits' federalizing function, that is, the courts'
responsibility to reconcile the Constitution and national policies with state
42
and local interests.
B. "Structural" Solutions Other Than Changes in Circuit Boundaries
The Commission must first scrutinize, and seriously consider suggesting,
a broad spectrum of limited solutions, other than circuit boundary
43
alterations, which can fairly be characterized as structural.
The remedies
may better promote prompt, efficacious and equitable resolution, in part
because the approaches would apparently be rather simple and easier to
implement and, therefore, ultimately less disruptive, while these measures
could specifically and narrowly treat the phenomena which seem to prohibit
expeditious, effective and fair disposition.
One such potential solution is subject matter panels of particular appellate
courts that decide cases in designated substantive fields, including oil and
44
gas, an approach which the Fifth Circuit has successfully employed.
Another helpful example is the Bankruptcy Appellate Panels ("BAP") used
40.
See supra notes 32, 35; infra notes 69-73 and accompanying text.
41. See supra note 32 and accompanying text. The Fifth Circuit's division may have
minimally improved resolution. See supra notes 15-19 and accompanying text; infra note 67.
42.
See CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT. LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 3. at 10-13 (5th ed. 1994);
John Minor Wisdom, Requiem for a Great Court, 26 LOY. L. REV. 787, 788 (1980); see also
BAKER, supra note 6, at 202 (adding judges ''does not achievi:: any lasting improvement"); supra
note 35 (recounting more disadvantages); infra note 60 and accompanying text (same). The
measures assessed are illustrative and are not exhaustively evaluated.
At each subsection's
conclusion, I suggest sources that analyze these measures and others more extensively.
43. The introductory comment treated structural with boundary changes and characterized
both as rather extreme. The Commission's authorizing statute expressly prescribes both, although
many "structural" approaches considered here would be more modest and less disruptive.
44. See REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE, supra note 8, at 120-21. See
generally Stuart Nagel, Systematic Assignment of Judges: A Proposal, 10 JUDICATURE 73 (Aug.Sept. 1986) (analyzing panels and a system that factors judges' interests and abilities in case
assignments).
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Congress apparently found the panels' deployment
in the Ninth Circuit.
sufficiently efficacious to require that all appeals courts institute BAPs or
46
justify not implementing them.
A related measure is courts which have national appellate subject matter
jurisdiction. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has
generally afforded specialization's benefits, such as expertise, efficiency and
enhanced consistency in the identified area of federal law, namely copyright,
47
However, the
trademark and patents, since its 1982 creation.
circumscribed focus of courts with nationwide subject matter jurisdiction
contravenes the long-standing tradition of generalist judges, and the tribunals
may be susceptible to capture by interests which regularly appear before
48
them.
Other possibilities are appeals court panels that include fewer than three
49
decisionmakers or that consist of district judges who are responsible for
50
error correction, both of which would conserve the judicial resources of
appellate courts. Nevertheless, two-judge panels will experience difficulty
51
when the members disagree, while panels constituting three district judges
might be reluctant to overturn rulings of colleagues who occupy identical
positions in the judicial hierarchy and could include )urists whom Presidents
5
A rather provocative
appointed primarily for their trial court expertise.

45.
See 28 U.S.C. §§ 158(a), (b) (1994); see also Michael A. Berch, The Bankruptcy
Appellate Panel and Its Implications for Adoption of Specialist Panels in the Courts of Appeals, in
RESTRUCTURING JUSTICE, supra nme 23, at 165-91.
46.
See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, § 104(c), 108 Stat. 4106,
4109-10; see also LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 33, at 47-49.
47.
See Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982. Pub. L. No. 97-164, § 127, 96 Stat. 25,
37-38 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (1994)). See generally Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, The
Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REY. I (1989) (assessing the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit); United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
Tenth Anniversary Commemorative Issue, 41 AM. U. L. REY. 559 (1992) (same).
48.
See, e.g.' BAKER, supra note 6, at 222; REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY
COMMITTEE, supra note 8, at 120-21; Lawrence Baum, Specializing the Federal Courts: Neutral
Reforms or Efforts to Shape Judicial Policy?, 74 JUDICATURE 217, 224 (1991).
49. See, e.g., BAKER, supra note 6, at 172; LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 33, at 131-32;
Diarmuid F. O'Scannlain, Statement to the Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal
Courts of Appeals 3-4 (Apr. 24, 1998) (visited Nov. 11, 1998) < http://app.comm.uscourts.gov
/hearings/newyork/oscannl.htm >[hereinafter O' Scannlain Statement].
50.
See, e.g., LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 33, at 131-32; MCKENNA, supra note 7, at
133-39.
See, e.g., MCKENNA, supra note 7, at 127-33; Newman Statement, supra note 30, at 3;
51.
Carl Tobias, The Impoverished Idea of Circuit-Splitting, 44 EMORY L.J. 1357, 1400 (1995).
See, e.g., Carl Tobias, Some Cautions About Structural Overhaul of the Federal Courts,
52.
51 U. MIAMI L. REY. 389, 404 (1997); see also 28 U.S.C. § 292(a) (1994) (authorizing district
judges to sit on appeals courts by designation); Richard B. Saphire & Michael E. Solimine, Diluting
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approach for the Ninth Circuit would keep the circuit intact but have
multiple divisions of the appeals court comprising the same complement of
active appellate judges who would be responsible for cases that arise from
53
the identical federal districts.
This concept would avoid disruption and
capitalize on certain administrative benefits of retaining the circuit, namely
expertise and fiscal economies, and ostensibly enable appeals court judges to
have greater familiarity with the trial judges whose decisions they review. 54
Once the Commission has thoroughly assessed structural remedies apart
from boundary changes, the entity must determine whether any of those
solutions alone or together will enable the regional circuits, which are not
expeditiously, effectively and fairly treating cases now, and the appellate
system, to do so with little deleterious effect. If the Commission concludes
that the remedies would permit such disrosition, it should recommend the
best : combination of approaches and exclude the courts from further
consideration.

C. Non-Structural Solutions
The same reasons which suggest that the Commission must first examine
"structural" measures other than modifications in circuit boundaries also
indicate that the entity should initially canvass, and carefully contemplate
55
proffering, many non-structural solutions. One potential problem with
analyzing and proposing these remedies is that the legislation which
authorizes the Commission expressly empowers it to recommend "changes in
circuit boundaries or structure. " 56 However, the Commission may find that
non-structural approaches would facilitate resolution which is as prompt,
efficacious and equitable as, and less disadvantageous than, boundary
alterations-thus essentially determining that no "changes in circuit
boundaries or structure . . . may be appropriate for the expeditious [, fair]
Justice on Appeal?: An Examination of the Use of District Court Judges Sitting by Designation on
The United States Courts of Appeals, 28 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 351, 376 (1995).
53. I am indebted to Judge Pamela Ann Rymer and Professors Paul Carrington and John
Oakley for this idea. See also Joseph E. Weis, Jr., Statement to the Commission on Structural
Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals 4-5 (Apr. 24, 1998) (visited Nov. 11, 1998)
< http://app.comm.uscourts.gov/ hearings/newyork/0424WEIS.htm >.
54. For more analysis of the "structural" measures examined above and evaluation of many
others, see BAKER, supra note 6, at 215-24, 238-79; MCKENNA, supra note 7, at 105-21; REPORT
OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE, supra note 8, at 118-23.
55. See supra notes 43-54 and accompanying text.
56. Department of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies
Appropriations Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-119, § 305, 111 Stat. 2440, 2491 (1997) (reprinted at
28 U.S.C.A. § 41 (1997) (historical and statutory notes)).
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and effective disposition of the [appellate] caseload. " 57 Congress arguably
intended that the Commission broadly read "structure" or suggest nonstructural alternatives.
Two important measures which do not directly implicate structure ate the
authorization of appellate commissioners and of additional judgeships.
Appellate commissioners, a concept with which the Ninth Circuit'. has
58
recently experimented, might augment existing judicial resources and
improve disposition by assuming a broad range of responsibilities. For
example, the officers could expedite rulings on non-dispositive motions and
on attorney fee requests, might serve as the appeals court analogue of
magistrate judges or may discharge several tasks, such as case screening,
issue tracking and opinion drafting, which circuit staff now perform, thereby
59
enhancing visibility and accountability.
.
The creation of more judgeships has been one critical component of the
conventional congressional response to docket growth. Enhanced judicial
resources could facilitate prompt, efficacious and equitable resolution,
although some observers assert that expanding the membership of larger
courts can have adverse consequences, such as decreases in collegiality and
60
the consistency of intracircuit decisionmaking.
Reliance on visiting appellate and district judges to staff three-judge
panels is a practice which is closely related to the authorization of additional
judgeships and which every court except the District of Columbia Circuit has
employed. Fifteen percent of judges who presently serve on panels are not
61
active members of the specific appeals courts on which they sit. Continued
and growing dependence on visiting judges may offer some benefits,
including supplementation of existing judicial resources, potential reductions
in intercircuit inconsistency, greater diversity and enhanced interaction of
62
appellate and district judges within and among appeals courts.
However,

57. Id.
58. See Hug, supra note 14, at 40; see also BAKER, supra note 6, at 175-76; MCKENNA,
supra note 7, at 129-33.
59. See MCKENNA, supra note 7, at 129-33; Hug, supra note 14, at 3.
60. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 16, at 10-11; Jon 0. Newman, /,OOOJudges-The Limit
For An Effective Federal Judiciary, 76 JUDICATURE 187, 188 (1993); Gerald B. Tjotlat, More
Judges, Less Justice, A.B.A. J., July 1993, at 70-73; see also Tobias, supra note 51, at 1388
(suggesting Ninth Circuit's 3276 combinations of three-judge panels may have these effects); supra
note 42 and accompanying text (same).
61. See supra note 21.
62. See Resnik, supra note 19.
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disadvantages, such as possible increases in intracircuit inconsistency and
. 11t b e impose
.
d .63
expense mig
Another important, albeit controversial, approach would be the
formalization of discretionary appellate review. The appeals courts have
esseptially
instituted this remedy by restricting the number of oral arguments
·l•
and. published opinions afforded and by substantially relying on staff.
Foqnal recognition of discretionary review would more candidly
acknowledge certain realities of modern appellate disposition and could
conserve judicial resources; however, the concept may be unconstitutional
64
and would alter appeal of right that has a long, revered history.
The non-structural solutions also include numerous, principally
procedural, measures which the regional circuits have specifically invoked to
address expanding dockets. These encompass various alternatives to dispute
resolution, different en bane practices, diverse case screening and issue
designation mechanisms, a broad spectrum of technological innovations, the
placement of enhanced dependence on court staff and additional options as
discussed above.
The Ninth Circuit contends that application of the
techniques enumerated and many others, such as special provision for longrange planning and a unique case "weighting" system, has permitted it to
treat the largest appellate court docket promptly, efficaciously, equitably and
.
l y. 65
consistent
After the Commission has intensively reviewed a wide range of nonstructural approaches, the entity must ascertain whether any of the remedies
individually, together, or combined with "structural" solutions, will allow
the remaining appeals courts, which do not afford expeditious, effective and
fair disposition, and the appellate system to so decide cases but have minimal
deleterious impact. Only if the Commission definitively finds that none of
the measures would facilitate this type of resolution, should it then consider
boundary alterations.
63. Visitors are less familiar with circuit law, traditions and active judges and impose travel
and administrative costs. See BAKER, supra note 6, at 198-201; MCKENNA, supra note 7, at 38-39;
see also Tobias, supra note 14, at 227 (suggesting other ways to augment resources but recognizing
more judges and staff may pose above problems or increase bureaucratization).
See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1994); see also BAKER, supra note 6, at 234-38; Robert M.
64.
Parker & Ron Chapman, Jr., Accepting Reality: The Time for Adopting Discretionary Review in the
Courts of Appeals Has Arrived, 50 SMU L. REV. 573, 578-82 (1997); Richman & Reynolds, supra
note 6, at 277-78.
65. See JOE S. CECIL, ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE IN A LARGE APPELLATE COURT: THE
NINTH CIRCUIT INNOVATIONS PROJECT (Federal Judicial Center 1985); Hug, supra note 14, at 40;
Tobias, supra note 14, at 240-41. But see supra notes 10, 19. For more analysis of the "nonstructural" measures examined above and evaluation of many others, see BAKER, supra note 6, at
108-47, 151-81, 187-214; MCKENNA, supra note 7, at 123-39; LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 33,
at 131-33.
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D. Changes in Circuit Boundaries
Extensive Commission assessment of limited, circuit-specific remedies
will reveal many that would permit any appeals courts which the entity
conclusively determines are not promptly, efficaciously and equitably
addressing cases to do so. If this survey clearly shows that no solutions
alone or together would enable regional circuits and the appellate system to
treat appeals as expeditiously, effectively and fairly as, and with fewer
disadvantages than, modifications in boundaries, the Commission should
explore boundary changes.
The Commission could variously approach alterations of boundaries. The
entity must remember that boundary adjustments by themselves will not
necessarily foster prompt, efficacious and equitable disposition, and could
have adverse consequences. For instance, such modifications, without more,
may essentially reallocate the workload by requiring the identical total
number of judges to address the same caseload, and the changes could
66
disrupt precedent and judicial administration.
Recent proposals for
bifurcating the Ninth Circuit demonstrate, and the operation of the Fifth and
Eleventh Circuits, since their 1980 creation from the former Fifth Circuit,
67
may illustrate those dynamics.
The Commission might also keep in mind
certain boundary-alteration criteria-that appeals courts should include three
or more jurisdictions, states which are adjacent and jurisdictions that have
diverse populations, legal business and socioeconomic interests-which the
Commission on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System (the Hruska
68
Commission) articulated in 1973 and remains salient today.
These propositions mean that the Commission must emphasize boundary
adjustments which will be most salutary, while the entity may want to
consider those modifications in conjunction with other measures that would
promote expeditious, effective and fair resolution but involve little detriment.
More specifically, the Commission might scrutinize "minimalist" boundary
changes which implicate, for example, the fewest federal districts or states or
66.
See supra notes 35, 40-42 and accompanying text.
67. Smaller courts may better resolve cases, a view which finds some support in experience
since the Fifth Circuit's 1980 division. See, e.g., Tjotlat, supra note 60, at 70-73; Eric J. Gribbin,
Note, California Split: A Plan To Divide the Ninth Circuit, 47 DUKE L.J. 351, 381-82 (1997);
Becker Letter, supra note 35, at 3. But see supra notes 15-19 and accompanying text. Recent
proposals to realign the Ninth Circuit would not have improved resolution in the new Ninth Circuit
but might have done so in the new Twelfth Circuit while disrupting precedent and judicial
administration. See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text; infra notes 69-73 and accompanying
text.
See Commission on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System. The Geographical
68.
Boundaries of the Several Judicial Circuits: Recommendations for Change, 62 F.R.D. 223, 231-32
(1973) [hereinafter Hruska Commission].
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combine that approach and the structural and non-structural solutions
examined earlier which have the greatest promise.

1.

The Ninth Circuit

The analyses in the third part of this m1ss1ve and in the remainder of
section four suggest that the Ninth Circuit promptly, efficaciously and
equitably treats cases today, or that the application of many mechanisms
apart from boundary alterations would enable it to do so. However, I
concentrate on this court because the statute which authorized the
Commission expressly mentions the circuit and the recent dispute over the
court's division prompted establishment of the entity. Moreover, attempts to
identify those adjustments in Ninth Circuit boundaries that would most
improve resolution and impose minimal disadvantage could inform similar
efforts to evaluate other appeals courts.
Numerous concepts show that modifications of the Ninth Circuit's
boundaries which Congress has considered or federal courts observers have
recommended would be insufficiently effective to warrant adoption. The
aforementioned general propositions involving the disruption of precedent
69
and judicial administration apply to the Ninth Circuit.
For instance,
bifurcation may foster inconsistent enforcement of the law that governs
maritime matters, commerce and utilities in the two new courts along the
West Coast, complicating economic activities and forcing attorneys to
research the case precedent of both tribunals for possible cross-circuit
70
transactions.
A split of the court could concomitantly lead to conflicting
interpretations of federal statutes which cover the environment and in
additional areas that the Ninth Circuit has uniformly applied throughout the
71
West.
Division might also promote forum shopping by litigants and
counsel, while it may undermine the appellate courts' federalizing function
72
and could limit intercircuit consistency.
Moreover, bifurcation would

69. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
70. See Hug, supra note 14, at 39; J. Clifford Wallace, Statement to the Commission on
Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals 5 (Apr. 3, 1998) (visited Nov. 8, 1998)
< hup://app.comm. uscourts.gov/hearings/chicago/wallace.htm > [hereinafter Wallace Statement].
Of course, this situation now pertains to the East and Gulf Coasts.
71. See Hearing on S. 948 Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Admin. Practice of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, !Olst Cong. 286-87 (1990) (statement of Sen. Pete Wilson); id. at 508
(statement of Michael Traynor); Schwarzer Statement, supra note 16, at 3.
72. See Gribbin, supra note 67, at 392; Wallace Statement, supra note 70, at 5; supra note 42
and accompanying text.
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necessitate duplicative administration and might reduce the diversity of each
73
court.
Even were restructuring less disruptive and more efficacious, the Ninth
Circuit resists felicitous reconfiguration. The principal explanation for this
circumstance is that California has a gigantic population base, which
generates a majority of the court's appeals and comprises four federal
districts. Congress and many observers of the Ninth Circuit and the federal
courts have found it inadvisable to institute the unprecedented actions of
creating a one-state circuit or of placing California's districts in two appellate
courts, the options for addressing the jurisdiction which have received the
greatest consideration.
California might become a circuit by itself, perhaps with several judges in
addition to those presently stationed there, so that the court could better
resolve the large number of cases that the state produces. However, a
single-jurisdiction circuit may lack the diversity of backgrounds which
judges who have practiced and lived in different states offer. 74 Moreover,
one senator having long tenure might influence too substantially the court's
75
Splitting
appointments and, thus, could mold the circuit for a generation.
California and assigning the jurisdiction's four federal districts to different
appeals courts may correspondingly foster different interpretations of
76
California substantive law which apply within the state.
These difficulties
mean that neither major method of treating California has garnered much
support, particularly in Congress.
Other Ninth Circuit realignments which respond less directly to California
and which senators and representatives have evaluated and federal courts
observers have proposed appear comparatively inefficacious.
Several
alternatives that Congress has seriously considered would not effectively
distribute the circuit caseload and active judges or might contravene
applicable criteria for boundary alteration, such as the standards which the
Hruska Commission enunciated. 77 For instance, proposals to create an
appeals court constituting the five jurisdictions of the Pacific Northwest
78
would have allocated the docket and judgeships in an unbalanced manner.
73. See Schwarzer Statement, supra note 16, at 3; Tobias, supra note 14, at 241 n.307.
74. See Hruska Commission, supra note 68, at 237; Wallace Statement, supra note 70, at 5.
75. See Hruska Commission, supra note 68, at 237; see also Gribbin, supra note 67, at 384.
California is obviously quite diverse.
76. See Hruska Commission, supra note 68, at 238-39. But see O'Scannlain Statement, supra
note 49, at 5-6; cf. Becker Letter, supra note 35, at 3 (suggesting California's recently-instituted
certification procedure would ameliorate problem).
77. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
78. See, e.g., S. 853, 104th Cong. (1995); S. 948, lOlst Cong. (1990); see also supra notes
31-32 and accompanying text.
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An analogous suggestion included Arizona with these states; however, this
composition would have minimally ameliorated the uneven caseload and
79
would. have violated the idea of contiguity.
Additional possibilities deserve little assessment because they seem even
more;·impracticable. For example, trifurcation would disrupt precedent and
judicial administration while requiring unnecessary, new expenditures, such
80
The
as the costs of redundant court staff and administrative structures.
notion of transferring jurisdictions-namely Arizona, Idaho and Montana,
which are currently in the Ninth Circuit-to the adjacent courts of the Eighth
or Tenth Circuits would concomitantl( disturb multiple appellate courts and
federal districts and impose expense. 8 In short, the Commission could well
conclude that the Ninth Circuit, principally because of the conundrum
82
presented by California, defies efficacious restructuring.

2.

The Ninth and Other Circuits

Several provocative recommendations which Third Circuit Chief Judge
Edward Becker recently provided the Commission correspondingly illustrate
the application of the above general approach to the Ninth Circuit, other
appeals courts and the system. 83 Chief Judge Becker proposed that the
Commission evaluate the prospect of moving Arizona, Idaho and Montana
from the Ninth to the Tenth Circuit. However, the earlier analysis indicates
that neither appellate court seems to be resolving cases slowly, ineffectively
and unfairly8 and, even if one were, Chief Judge Becker's suggestion is less
workable than numerous limited, circuit-specific measures.
His
recommendation could detrimentally affect two appeals courts and three
federal districts, primarily by disrupting precedent and judicial

79. See, e.g., S. 431, 105th Cong. (1997); S. 956, 104th Cong. (1995); see also Gribbin,
supra note 67, at 385-87; supra notes 39-41, 68 and accompanying text.
80. See O'Scannlain Statement, supra note 49, at 7; see also supra note 73 and accompanying
text.
81. See Hruska Commission, supra note 68, at 236-37; Tobias, supra note 14, at 245.
82. For analysis of additional problems that could attend the Ninth Circuit's division, see Carl
Tobias, Why Congress Should Not Split the Ninth Circuit, 50 SMU L. REV. 583, 596 (1997); Hug,
supra note 14, at 41; Tobias, supra note 14, at 241-42. But see Gribbin, supra note 67, at 389-91.
83. See Becker Letter, supra note 35, at 3-5; see also supra pages 19-20 (affording general
approach). The proposals illustrate the approach by way of comparison.
84. See supra notes 15-19 and accompanying text.
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85

administration,
and would apparently decrease the diversity of both
appellate tribunals. 86
What Chief Judge Becker characterized as the "small workload" of the
D.C. Circu~t led him to tender the "dr?ma~ic" ,Proposa.J t?at this court ~e
8 The JUnst supported his
"merged with the Fourth or Federal Circmt."
suggestion by acknowledging that the court's "administrative Jaw caseload is
celebrated, but [asserting that] all the circuits have those cases, if in smaller
numbers, and the D.C. Circuit also has many drug and sentencing cases, just
88
like the other circuits. "
This approach, which Chief Judge Becker
premised on a Judicial Conference recommendation in its Long Range Plan
that workloads be "equalized among judges of the courts of appeals
89
nationally, " arguably misconceives the relevant inquiry. The Commission
should consider proposing boundary changes only after it has definitively
identified slow, ineffective and unfair appellate resolution and has exhausted
many other options. Nevertheless, once the Commission allows for the
complexity of the D.C. Circuit's docket, which the enormous records
underlying challenges to federal agency decisions typify, the entity may
ascertain that the court's workload is so insubstantial as to suggest delayed,
inefficacious and inequitable disposition. Should the Commission reach this
determination, it might find relatively modest solutions, such as reductions in
the circuit's authorized judgeships, to be less disruptive and, thus, superior. 90
Even if the Commission concludes that the situation resists remediation
with measures which are more moderate than boundary-alteration, the entity
could decide that approaches different from the one recommended by Chief
Judge Becker would prove rather salutary in part because they would disturb
less significantly the three courts' precedent, judicial administration, and
traditions. After all, the D.C. Circuit is the preeminent court for reviewing
appeals of agency decisionmaking, which comprise half of the circuit's
caseload, while the court's judges often possess substantial understanding of
91
administrative law, practice, procedure and policy.
The Federal Circuit
85. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
86. See supra note 68 and accompanying text. Moreover, the recommendation would
minimally ameliorate the impact of the large Ninth Circuit caseload.
87. Becker Letter, supra note 35. at 4.
88. Id.
89. Id.; LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 33, at 45.
90. The Republican Senate has partly effected this idea by not filling a vacancy in one of the
court's twelve positions. See, e.g .. 143 CONG. REC. S2515-S2541 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 1997); Neil
A. Lewis, Clinton Has a Chance to Shape the Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 1997, at 30.
91.
See, e.g .. Spottswood W. Robinson, III, The D.C. Circuit: An Era of Change, 55 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 715, 716-17 (1987); Carl Tobias, The D.C. Circuit as a National Court, 48 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 159, 174-75 (1993). It is also the "least regional" of the regional circuits.
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concomitantly has national subject matter jurisdiction over narrow, technical
fields, and the court's members frequently have specialized expertise,
92
particularly involving science and technology.
Should the Commission definitively determine that the Fourth Circuit is
not · expeditiously, effectively and fairly resolving appeals, that the
authorization of a few judgeships for the court or other limited, circuitspecific solutions would be inadequate and that boundary modifications are
preferable, the entity might entertain the prospect of transferring Maryland
from the Fourth to the Third Circuit. This realignment would affect only one
jurisdiction, which is a single-district state and which is contiguous to the
Third Circuit, and it would distribute the caseloads of the two appeals courts
93
more evenly.
In short, Chief Judge Becker has formulated several thought-provoking
proposals. Unfortunately, those propositions seem unlikely to improve the
situations of the regional circuits for which he posits suggestions or of the
appellate system. However, his recommendations trenchantly illustrate the
need for the Commission to exercise caution when proposing change in the
appeals courts that have served the nation so well for more than a century.

V. CONCLUSION

If the Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts
of Appeals implements the suggestions afforded above, the entity can comply
with the congressional mandate and complete its substantial task in the
limited time which is available. These recommendations should enable the
Commission to ascertain whether any regional circuits are not deciding cases
promptly, efficaciously and equitably now and, if the entity so determines, to
propose measures that will facilitate expeditious, effective and fair
resolution. Best of luck in this endeavor, which is critical to the future of the
federal appellate courts.

92. See supra note 47 and accompanying text. It is not even considered a regional circuit.
93. See Terminated Cases, supra note 15. The transfer would disturb two circuits but is less
disruptive than merging the Federal or D.C. Circuits. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
The Fifth and Eleventh Circuits warrant minimal analysis. The evaluation above suggests that
neither court may promptly, efficaciously and equitably treat cases today. See supra notes 15-19, 67
and accompanying text. However, controversy over, and inability to resolve, this issue and the two
courts' relatively recent creation mean that they and Congress might resist realignment.

